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Civil Action File No. 
2008CV152463 
ORDER ON VARIOUS MOTIONS TO DISMISS, MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 
PLEADINGS, and MOTION TO STAY 
On February 18, 2009, Counsel appeared before the Court to present oral 
argument on the following motions: (1) Motion to Stay filed by Defendant Mark Gainor; 
(2) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendant Arthur Anderson; (3) 
Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant King & Spalding; (4) Motion to Dismiss filed by 
Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith; (5) Partial Motion to Dismiss 
Complaint filed by Defendants Mark J. Gainor, Lucor Partners LTD., and Lucor 
2 
Ventures, LLC; (6) Motion to Dismiss Gainor Defendants' Counterclaims filed by 
Plaintiffs; (7) Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims of Arthur Andersen filed by Plaintiffs; (8) 
Motion to Dismiss Mark Gainer's Third Party Complaint filed by Third Party Defendant 
Mark C. Klopfenstein. After reviewing the briefs submitted by the parties on these 
motions, the pleadings of the case, and the oral arguments presented by counsel, the 
Court hereby finds as follows: 
Statement of Common Facts Relevant to All Motions: 
In 1998, Mark Gainor sold one of his companies, Gainor Medical Management, 
LLC, for $130 million. The sale generated a large potential personal tax liability for Mr. 
Gainor for the 1999 tax year, and prompted Mr. Gainor to consult with his accounting 
firm, Arthur Andersen, for financial and tax planning purposes. Arthur Andersen 
proposed a series of transactions that would generate a "loss" to substantially offset Mr. 
Gainor's tax liability. As a result, in September 1999, Mark Gainor signed two 
engagement letter with Arthur Andersen on behalf of his companies Bryan Medical Inc., 
and Gainor Medical USA ("GMUSA,,)1 to assist in setting up the proposed transactions, 
which were later characterized by the IRS as a "BOSS" 2 tax strategy that generated 
non-deductible losses (hereinafter the "tax scheme"). 
1 GMUSA was merged with Lucor Special Investments Inc. in November 1999. For 
purposes of this Order, the Court will hereafter refer to GMUSA and Lucor Special 
Investments, Inc., collectively as "Lucor Special Investments." 
2 BOSS is an acronym for Bond and Option Sales Strategy. Typically, taxpayers act 
through a partnership by contributing cash to a newly formed foreign corporation in 
exchange for common stock. Another investor contributes additional capital to the 
corporation in exchange for preferred stock. The foreign corporation acquires additional 
capital through bank financing for which the bank obtains a security interest in securities 
acquired by the foreign corporation equal to the amount borrowed. The foreign 
corporation makes a distribution of the encumbered securities to the partnership that 
holds the common stock. This reduces the remaining value of the foreign corporation's 
3 
Under the terms of the tax strategy, Mark Gainor and his wife Elyse executed 
stock purchase agreements ("SPAs':) on behalf of two companies: Bryan Medical, Inc., 
which is the predecessor in interest to Plaintiff Bryan Ventures Inc., ("BVI") and Lucor 
Special Investment Inc., which is the predecessor in interest to Plaintiff Palladium 
Investment Corporation, ("PIC,,).3 Bryan Medical Inc. and Lucor Special Investment Inc., 
were whOlly-owned subsidiaries of MJG Partners, Inc. Mark Gainor was a 45% limited 
partner in MJG Partners, Inc., and held a 48 % interest in MJG Ventures Inc., a Gainor 
family-owned LLC, with his wife (26%), sister (13%), and father (13%), the remaining 
members. MJG Ventures, Inc. was the 55% general partner of MJG Partners. In 
addition, at the time of the SPAs, Mark Gainor was the sole officer and director of both 
Bryan Medical, Inc. and Lucor Special Investments Inc. 
Third Party Defendant Mark Klopfenstein was a former Arthur Andersen manager 
and accountant for Mark Gainor, controlled TranStar Capital Corporation, a private 
investment bank that specialized in tax restructurings, and was involved in the tax 
scheme transactions. Mr. Klopfenstein was also president and owner of both LSI 
common stock to zero. It is understood by all parties that the foreign corporation will, 
however, repay the debt to the financing bank with other assets. Nonetheless, because 
the distribution to the partnership is subject to the bank debt, the parties take the 
position that the distribution is zero. The partnership is treated as having subsequently 
disposed of the stock of the foreign corporation giving rise to a tax loss equal the excess 
of the partnership's original basis in the stock (the amount paid for the common stock) 
over the fair market value of the common stock after the distribution of the securities 
(zero). In a subsequent year, the bank debt is repaid from other assets of the foreign 
corporation. Although the parties previously treated the debt as reducing the amount of 
the earlier distribution to zero, the return position of the taxpayers is that the foreign 
corporation's repayment of the debt is not treated as a distribution on its common stock. 
These purported losses are not allowed for federal income tax purposes as they do not 
represent bona fide losses reflecting actual economic consequences. See I.R.S. Notice 
99-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-99-59.pdf . 
3 November 1999 letters of intent signed for the BVI and PIC SPAs (signed by Samuel 
Hudgins as trustee to the Palladium Financial Trust. (Ex. 3 to Klopfenstein Ans.) 
4 
Holdings, LLC,4 and Bryan Holdings, LLC. Pursuant to the SPAs, Bryan Holdings LLC 
acquired Bryan Medical Inc., (December 14,1999, for $297,115) and LSI Holdings LLC 
acquired Lucor Special Investments, Inc., (December 23,1999, for $125,755). Through 
a series of mergers and name changes, Bryan Medical Inc. became BVI and Lucor 
Special Investments Inc. became PIC. Mark Klopfenstein is currently the sole 
shareholder, officer, and director of both Plaintiffs BVI and PIC. 
The terms of the SPAs contained a merger clause and statement regarding the 
sufficiency of representations and warranties, general releases signed by MJG Partners 
by its general Partner MJG Ventures and by Mark and Elyse Gainor individually (Exhibit 
5.2), 5 indemnity obligations to Plaintiffs (Exhibit 5.2), a personal guarantee signed by 
Defendant Mark Gainor on all of MJG Partners' obligations (Section 5.7), a true-up 
provision (Section 4.5), 6 and defined terms such as losses and affiliates. 
4 Both LSI Holdings, LLC and Bryan Holdings, LLC were members of the Palladium 
Financial Trust, an investment vehicle entity owned in part and operated by Mark 
Klopfenstein. 
5 "For good and valuable consideration, including the consideration to be received by 
the undersigned pursuant to the Stock Purchase Agreement, the receipt, adequacy and 
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the [Gainor Defendants do] hereby 
release and forever discharge [Bryan Holdings LLC/LSI Holdings] from any and all 
liabilities, obligations, claims, demands, rights or causes of action existing or relating to 
transactions or events occurring on or prior to the execution and delivery of the stock 
purchase agreement, whether known or unknown, direct or indirect, liquidated, matured, 
contingent or otherwise, including by way of illustration and without limitation, all 
agreements, obligations and understandings of the Company involving the undersigned 
existing or in effect on or prior to the execution of the SPA and all claims and causes of 
action (whether at law or in equity) of [the Gainor Defendants] against [Bryan Holdings 
LLC/LSI Holdings] existing on or prior to or relating to periods prior to the execution of 
the SPA, but excluding only liabilities, obligations, claims, demands, rights and causes 
of action of or against [Bryan Holdings/LSI Holdings] arising under the SPA." 
6 "In the event that the net realizable asset value of the Company as of the close of 
business on the date of the Closing is greater than the net realizable asset value of the 
Company as of the close of business on December 9, 1999, the Company agrees to, 
and the Purchaser agrees to cause the Company to pay Shareholder the amount by 
In addition, as a part of the tax scheme, Bryan Medical Inc., and Lucor Special 
Investments purchased Treasury Bills through Defendant Merrill Lynch.? Bryan Medical 
and Lucor Special Investment also obtained an opinion letter from Defendant Brown & 
Wood,8 predecessor to Defendant Sidley Austin Brown & Wood ("Sidley Austin"), 
regarding the legality of the tax scheme deduction, and retained Defendant King & 
Spalding to negotiate and draft the SPAs. 
In December 1999, before the SPAs closed, the IRS issued a notice regarding 
the tax treatment of BOSS strategies and declared them an invalid deduction. In 
5 
response to the newly issued notice, certain parties to the tax scheme (King & Spalding, 
Arthur Andersen, Mark Klopfenstein, and Mark Gainor) met in December, 1999 to 
discuss the IRS notice and its impact on the planned transactions. As described above, 
the transactions were consummated and closed as planned. 
In 2002, Sidley Austin sent a letter to Mr. Gainor recommending that he consult 
with his personal tax advisors and consider participating in the IRS's voluntary program 
to pay disallowed deductions (i.e., the BOSS deductions). Mr. Gainor participated in the 
voluntary program and the IRS initiated a tax audit of Mr. Gainor and the circumstances 
regarding the deductions created by the BOSS strategy. Mr. Gainor enlisted the 
which such net realizable asset value of the Company ....... the determination of the net 
realizable asset value of the Company as of the close of business on the date of the 
Closing shall be made by Arthur Andersen, LLP who shall promptly upon such 
determination notify the Purchasers and the Shareholder of any Short Fall or Excess." 
? Citing ,-r 88-90 of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they entered into certain short-
term US Treasury Bill investments ("T-Bills") upon the recommendation and advice of 
Merrill Lynch. The T-Bills are alleged by Plaintiffs to be a critical component of the Boss 
Tax strategy. 
8 The opinion letters were dated December 31, 1999; thus, they were delivered after the 
SPAs closed. 
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assistance of Defendants Arnold & Porter and Rachlin LLp9 to navigate the IRS audit 
and negotiations. As a result of the audit, the "losses" claimed by Defendant Gainor 
were disallowed. The IRS also concluded that the fees paid and deductions taken by 
Bryan Medical and Lucor Special Investments for the implementation of the tax strategy 
were not allowable business expense deductions for the Plaintiff corporations. 
Defendant Mark Gainor filed an action in the Southern District of Florida ("Florida 
I Action") against Sidley Austin, Arthur Andersen, Merrill Lynch and Mark Klopfenstein in 
2006 alleging that Defendants conspired to defraud Gainor into entering into the BOSS 
strategy. Mark Klopfenstein claimed in the Florida I Action that as an affiliate of 
Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' successors the releases executed by Mark Gainor covered him 
as well. The Florida I Action seeks the rescission of the SPAs and related documents 
containing the release and indemnification agreements. 
In 2002, after receiving an audit notice from the IRS, BVI and PIC notified MJG 
Partners and Mark Gainor of the audit and offered an opportunity to control the 
proceedings. Pursuant to the indemnity provisions of the SPAs, MJG Partners and 
Mark Gainor first declined, but then accepted in 2003. Beginning in 2003, Plaintiffs BVI 
and PIC sent the Gainor Defendants notice of indemnification claims. From 2003-2007, 
Lucor Partners and Gainor indemnified Plaintiffs for over sixty invoices with tax 
consequences totaling over $160,000.10 On June 2,2008, Plaintiffs BVI and PIC sent 
Mr. Gainor and Lucor Partners a demand letter requesting payment of approximately 
9 Plaintiffs and Defendant Rachlin reached a settlement agreement prior to the 
scheduled oral argument on these motions. 
10 Plaintiffs' Complaint ~ 171. 
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$160,000 worth of additional indemnification payments in 10 days or they would "pursue 
all legal remedies available .... " 
On June 1 0, 2008, the day before the expiration of the demand window, 
Defendant Mark Gainor filed a companion case in the Southern District of Florida (the 
"Florida II Action" or, collectively, "Florida Actions") related to certain actions 
Klopfenstein and Plaintiffs took while the case was temporarily stayed and seeking a 
declaratory judgment on the scope of the indemnity obligations Mark Gainor and his 
companies owed to BVI and PIC under the SPAs.11 
Subsequently, on June 20, 2008, Plaintiffs PIC and BVI filed this action claiming 
that Defendant Gainor breached his fiduciary duties owed to them by implementing a 
personal tax strategy, breached the relevant stock purchase agreements with regard to 
indemnity obligations, and defrauded Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claim that the other named 
Defendants either breached their independent fiduciary duties owed to them, or aided 
and abetted the alleged fraud/breach of fiduciary committed by Mark Gainor. Defendant 
Arthur Andersen filed counterclaims for indemnification pursuant to the engagement 
letter agreement. Defendants Gainor, Lucor Ventures and Lucor Partners filed 
11 BVI and PIC filed motions to dismiss in the Florida Actions which were pending before 
the Florida District Court during oral argument. Defendants represents that these cases 
are anticipated to be formally consolidated and tried together in 2009, however, 
Plaintiffs disagree. Defendants highlight that the parties have undertaken extensive 
discovery in the Florida I Action, however the parties in the Florida Actions and in this 
case are not identical. For example, Defendants Arthur Andersen, Merrill Lynch, and 
Sidley Austin, have been dismissed from The Florida I Action after a settlement was 
reached. Additionally, Defendants Arnold & Porter, King & Spalding, and Rachlin 
Cohen were never parties to the Florida Actions. On March 16, 2009, Judge Martinez 
entered an Order granting in part and denying in part BVI and PIC's motions. The court 
also denied Defendants' request to stay the Florida Actions under the anticipatory filing 
exception to the first filed rule. 
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counterclaims against Plaintiffs and a Third Party Complaint against Mark Klopfenstein 
alleging fraud with regard to the tax scheme. 
Motions to Dismiss & Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings: 
Defendants, Counterclaim Defendants, and the Third Party Defendant filed various 
motions to dismiss and motions for judgment on the pleadings, as listed above and as 
addressed below. 
Standards 
In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b )(6), the Court 
must determine whether plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Under this standard, the Court must grant the motion if "(1) the allegations of the 
complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under 
any state of provable facts asserted in support therefore; and (2) the movant 
established that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the 
framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought." Stendahl 
v. Cobb Cty., 668 S.E.2d 723, 725 (2008). "In dealing with [a motion to dismiss] the trial 
court can look only to the complaint and not to the answer, because to consider the 
answer and other pleadings converts to a motion for judgment on the pleadings under 
OCGA § 9-11-12(c)." Martin v. Brown 222 Ga. App. 566, 566 (1996). 
The Court will treat all of the dispositive motions before it as motions for 
judgment on the pleadings and shall consider the pleadings in the case as well as the 
documents attached as exhibits and incorporated into those pleadings.12 
12 The Gainor Defendants argue in their opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on 
the pleadings on their counterclaims that a motion for judgment on the pleadings is 
inappropriate at this stage of proceeding in the case because the pleadings are not yet 
9 
In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-
12( c), the Court must determine whether the undisputed facts as pled entitle the movant 
to judgment as a matter of law. Harper v. Patterson, 270 Ga. App. 437,439 (2004). A 
defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted only where the 
pleadings disclose with certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under 
any state of provable facts, and the Court is charged to take all well-pleaded material 
allegations of the opposing party's pleadings are to be taken as true. Blier v. Greene 
263 Ga. App. 35, 35 (2003). 
Advisor Defendants' Motions 
Before the Court are Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings brought by 
Defendants Merril Lynch, and King & Spalding, and Arthur Andersen. These 
Defendants (collectively, the "Advisors" or "Advisor Defendants") assisted Defendant 
Mark Gainor and Third Party Defendant Mark Klopfenstein and their entities in 
structuring and effectuating the tax scheme. While each of the Advisor Defendants 
closed by the entry of a pre-trial order. See e.g., O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c) ("after the 
pleadings are closed ... "). The Georgia Supreme Court in Charles H. Wesley Educ. 
Foundation, Inc. v. State Election Bd. 282 Ga. 707, 708 (2007), addressed this issue in 
dicta stating that "it is not necessary to construe the motion to dismiss as a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, since the trial court has not entered a pre-trial order and, 
therefore, the pleadings are not, strictly speaking, "closed" within the meaning of OCGA 
§ 9-11-12(c)." See also, Richard C. Ruskell, DAVIS AND SHULMAN'S GA. PRAC. AND PROC. 
§ 9:7, p. 500 (2007-2008 ed.). After carefully reviewing the case law in this area, this 
Court concludes that a pre-trial order is not required for a court to convert a motion to 
dismiss to a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See e.g., Nelson v. Fulton County 
Bank, 147 Ga. App. 98 (1978) (affirming a trial court's grant of plaintiff's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings despite the fact that no pre-trial order was entered in that 
case); Haldi v. Piedmont Nephrology Associates, P.C., 283 Ga. App. 321 (2007) 
(affirming a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss as an appropriate order for 
judgment on the pleadings without reference to closed pleadings or a pre-trial order); 
Martin v. Brown 222 Ga. App. 566, 566 (1996). 
10 
played a different role in the alleged wrongdoings and each advances arguments 
specific to its involvement in the tax scheme, all argue that Plaintiffs' claims are barred 
by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs argue that their claims against the Advisor 
Defendants are tolled by fraudulent conduct occurring after the SPAs that was not 
discovered by them until Mark Gainor's 2007 deposition testimony in the Florida I Action 
when he admitted that the tax schemes were entered into for his sole personal 
benefit.13 The Advisor Defendants argue that the sole actor doctrine imputes Gainor's 
knowledge to Bryan Medical (now BVI) and Lucor Special Investments (now PIC) for the 
purposes of triggering the statute of limitations at the time of the SPAs. In addition, the 
Advisor Defendants argue that even if the sole actor doctrine is inapplicable, they did 
nothing to actively conceal any cause of action for purposes of tolling the statute of 
limitations against them until 2007. 
Imputation of Knowledge and the Sole Actor Doctrine 
Central to the Advisor Defendants' motions is the question of whether or not 
Gainor's knowledge of the allegedly improper purpose of the tax scheme is imputed to 
Bryan Medical and Lucor Special Investments. The knowledge of an agent is generally 
imputed to the principal and typically applies to corporate agents (Le., corporate officers 
and directors). Fouche v. Merchants' Nat. Bank of Rome, 110 Ga. 827, 36 S.E.256, 263 
(1900) (stating the general rule which "imputes the knowledge of an agent or officer of a 
corporation, acquired by virtue of his employees as such about matters relating to his 
employment, and over which he has supervision as the agent or officer of the company, 
as the knowledge of the corporation itself."). 
13 Plaintiffs' Complaint mr 113-118. 
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The adverse interest exception, however, provides that "when the officer or agent 
departs from the scope of his duties and acts in such a way that his private interest 
outweighs his obligation as a corporate representative, the law will not impute his 
knowledge to the corporation." Clarence L. Martin. P.C. v. Chatham County Tax 
Com'r, 258 Ga. App. 349, 350-351 (2002); see also, Keenan v. Hill, 190 Ga. App. 108 
(1989) (declining to impute an officer's knowledge of his own poor driving record to his 
employer for purposes of holding the employer liable under a theory of negligent 
entrustment). 
For example, in Williams v. Citizens Bank of Ashburn, 182 Ga. App. 461 (1987), 
the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict eliminating liability against third-party Defendant Citizen Bank of Ashburn. In this 
case, the jury found against Sarah and Philip Phelps, a mother-son team who 
defrauded the estate of Mr. Williams, who was Ms. Phelps' step-father-in-Iaw. Id. at 
461. She was listed as co-signor on several certificates of deposit ("CDs") owned by 
Mr. Williams. !Q. at 461-462. She transferred several CDs to Citizen Bank of Ashburn, 
where Mr. Phelps was an officer, and split the CDs into assets held solely by herself or 
Mr. Phelps. !Q. at 462. The liability of Citizen Bank hinged upon whether or not the 
knowledge of its officer, Mr. Phelps, could be imputed to it. The third-party plaintiff 
argued that because Mr. Phelps was acting in the scope and course of his employment 
as well as in a manner that conferred a benefit upon the bank, his knowledge should be 
imputed to it. !Q. The trial court and the Court of Appeals disagreed holding that Mr. 
Phelps was acting in his own interest and that any of his communications with the bank 
regarding these transactions were "adverse to his own interest." Id. 
12 
Defendants argue that during the planning and execution of the tax scheme-the 
time period during which Plaintiffs allege that Mark Gainor committed fraud and 
breached his fiduciary duties -Mark Gainor was acting as the agent of both Bryan 
Medical (now BVI) and Lucor Special Investments Inc. (now PIC). For example, Mark 
Gainor signed the Arthur Andersen engagement letter and the SPAs on behalf of and as 
agent for Bryan Medical and Lucor Special Investments. Thus, Defendants assert that 
Gainor's knowledge is imputed to Bryan Medical and Lucor Special Investments, and 
therefore, also to Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs, however, argue that the adverse interest exception bars the imputation 
of Defendant Gainor's knowledge to them. Fouche v. Marchants' Nat. bank of Rome, 
110 Ga. 827, 36 S.E.256, 263 (1900) ("A general exception to the [imputed knowledge 
of an agent to the principal] is that it usually has no application where the agent is acting 
for himself, in his own interst, and adversely to that of his principal."). Plaintiffs advance 
their argument by citing Mark Gainor's 2007 testimony in the Florida I Action that the 
sole purpose of the tax scheme was to generate a personal tax benefit.14 Plaintiffs 
argue that at the time that Mark Gainor planned, approved, and executed the tax 
scheme his interests were adverse to the interests of Bryan Medical and Lucor Special 
Investments, and thus, his knowledge of the tax scheme should not be imputed to 
Plaintiffs. 
The Court finds that from the time that the engagement letter with Arthur 
Andersen was signed, through the closing of the SPAs, Mark Gainor was acting as the 
corporate representative and agent for Bryan Medical (now BVI) and Lucor Special 
14 Plaintiffs' Complaint 1Ml113-118. 
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Investments (now PIC).15 But for the application of the adverse interest exception, 
Gainor's knowledge must be imputed to Plaintiffs' predecessors, and therefore, also to 
Plaintiffs. 
Defendants advance a second argument-an exception to the adverse interest 
exception-the sole owner or sole actor doctrine. Under this theory, which has neither 
been expressly rejected nor adopted in Georgia, when a corporate agent is also the 
sole representative or sole shareholder, her knowledge is imputed to the corporation 
regardless of whether or not the agent's interest was adverse to the corporation. See 
Alice Roofing & Sheet Metal works, Inc. v. Halleman, 775 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. App. 
1989) (declining to toll a statute of limitation on a claim to recover funds from a former 
sole shareholder to the time when the new owners learned of the transactions because 
the corporation had knowledge even if the new owners did not). 
In Fouche v. Merchants' Nat. Bank the Georgia Supreme Court examined 
whether or not the knowledge of a bank president (i.e., an agent) could be imputed to 
the bank (i.e., the principal) despite the president's adverse interest in the transaction 
giving rise to the bank's potential liability.16 110 Ga. 827 Ultimately, the Georgia 
Supreme Court imputed the knowledge of the agent to the principal on the grounds that 
15 See e.g., Plaintiffs' Complaint 1Ml26, 30, 50, 52, 57, 75, 81. 
16 In Fouche, J. King, president of defendant Merchants' National Bank of Rome, 
transferred 100 shares of stock in Rome Electric Light Co. to defendant as part of a 
settlement agreement on debts King owed to the bank. At the time of the transfer, 
however, King knew that he had not paid the subscription agreement despite the stock 
certificate legend marked "paid in full and nonassessable." Plaintiff Fouche obtained a 
judgment against then-insolvent Rome Electric Light Co., and sought to enforce it 
against its shareholders, including Defendant. Defendant moved for and was granted a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings from the trial court on the grounds that it was a 
bona fide purchaser for value without notice/knowledge of the unpaid subscription 
agreement, and therefore, not liable. 110 Ga. 827, 36 S.E. 256 (1990). 
14 
the bank ratified the transfer in retaining the stock, entering the assets on its books, and 
availing itself of the privileges of stock ownership . .!Q. at 264-265. 
Additionally, in Brobston v. Penniman, 97 Ga. 527 (1894), the Georgia Supreme 
Court imputed the knowledge of adversely interested officers to the bank for which they 
worked. Defendant Penniman formed a partnership with Messrs. Lloyd and 
Cunningham, who were the President and a loan cashier, respectively, for Brunswick 
State Bank. Messrs. Lloyd and Cunningham were obligated to make a $5000 combined 
capital contribution to the partnership, but unbeknownst to Mrs. Penniman, executed a 
note in the name of the partnership with the Brunswick State Bank for the entire 
amount. Id. at 350-351. When a receiver for the bank sued the partnership (and thus 
Mrs. Penniman) on the note, the Georgia Supreme Court imputed to the bank the 
knowledge of Lloyd and Cunningham-that the loans were entered into in bad faith and 
without authorization of the partnership. The Court held that because Lloyd and 
Cunningham were the agents of the bank and acting in the scope of their employment 
while making the transaction, whatever they "actually knew" was attributable to the 
bank. The Court further explained its reasoning by stating that "[t]he only way in which 
a corporation can have knowledge of a fact is through an officer or an agent. It has not, 
otherwise, eyes to see, ears to hear, or intellect with which to comprehend." .!Q. at 531. 
Citing several other jurisdictions' cases, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that "a 
corporation must of necessity entrust its affairs to officers and agents, and can transact 
business only through their agency, it must be held chargeable with their acts while in 
the performance of their duty to it; and, if its duly selected servants prove unfaithful to 
15 
their trust, the corporation itself must suffer, rather than innocent third persons." .!Q. at 
351-352. 
Plaintiffs argue that the Fouche and Brobston cases are distinguishable on the 
grounds that the courts in both opinions emphasized that the bank to whom the 
knowledge was imputed availed itself of the privileges of the notes, and that an 
"innocent" third party was involved. See, e.g., Brobston at 352. In the instant case, 
however, Bryan Medical (now BVI) and Lucor Special Investments (now PIC) received 
cash payments pursuant to the SPAs. Additionally, Plaintiffs have sought 
indemnification pursuant to the terms of the SPAs, and thus, have "availed" themselves 
of the privileges of the contracts. Unlike in Fouche and Brobston, however, it is the 
opinion of this Court that neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants in this case are "innocent" 
parties under the facts before the Court. Fouche and Brobston demonstrate that 
Georgia case law has recognized exceptions to the adverse interest exception when 
justified by the law and equity of a case. 
In an unpublished opinion from Northern District Court of Georgia, Laddin v. 
Edwards, 2005 WL 6076939, No. 1:02-CV-3327-TWT (Feb. 16,2005), Judge Thomas 
W. Thrash considered whether or not claims brought by a trustee in bankruptcy were 
barred from bringing claims against third parties for aiding and abetting a breach of 
fiduciary duties committed by Edwards, the bankrupt corporation's sole shareholder. Id. 
at *1-2. Whether or not the in pari delicto17 defense applied in Laddin, depended upon 
17 When both parties are equally at fault, equity will not interfere but will leave them 
where it finds them. The rule is otherwise if the fault of one decidedly overbalances that 
of the other." Ga. Code Ann., § 23-1-15. "Where two parties engage in a fraudulent 
transfer and are in pari delicto, equity will leave [the parties] where it finds them." 
16 
whether or not Edwards' conduct could be imputed to the bankrupt corporation. Id. at 
*3. Recognizing that Georgia law had not yet addressed the "imputation of a sole 
shareholder's knowledge to his wholly-owned corporation," Judge Thrash turned to 
federal law and declined to apply the adverse interest exception where the offending 
officer is the sole shareholder. !Q. at *4. Looking to the complaint, Judge Thrash 
emphasized plaintiff's allegations that Edwards was "at [the corporation's] helm," 
devised the scheme in question, and handled all of the details. !Q. Ultimately, the Court 
in Laddin imputed Edwards' knowledge to the corporation and held that the equitable 
defense of in pari delicto applied and barred the trustee's claims of aiding and abetting 
breach of fiduciary duty against third parties who alleged help facilitate Edwards' 
scheme. !Q. at *5-6. 
Laddin poses a factually relevant scenario and provides the Court with guidance 
on the issue of imputation of knowledge. In Laddin, the knowledge of the wrongdoing 
sole shareholder was imputed to the bankrupt corporation, and thus, formed the basis of 
applying the in pari delicto defense.18 Like in Laddin, the Plaintiffs in this case 
Laxton v. Laxton, 234 Ga. App. 221, 221 (1998) (quoting Langan v. Langan, 224 Ga. 
399 (1968)). 
Although Advisor Defendants argue the equitable defense of in pari delicto as an 
alternative ground to grant their motions, "the doctrine of clean hands has no application 
in a suit for damages for breach of a fiduciary relationship." Gibbs v. Dodson, 229 Ga. 
App. 64, 67 (1997) (refusing to apply the in pari delicto defense in a civil suit between 
two former partners in a funeral home business where the partner who bought out the 
first partner did not inform him of a third party's offer to purchase the business prior to 
the sale). 
18 When both parties are equally at fault, equity will not interfere but will leave them 
where it finds them. The rule is otherwise if the fault of one decidedly overbalances that 
of the other." Ga. Code Ann., § 23-1-15. "Where two parties engage in a fraudulent 
transfer and are in pari delicto, equity will leave [the parties] where it finds them." 
Laxton v. Laxton, 234 Ga. App. 221, 221 (1998) (quoting Langan v. Langan, 224 Ga. 
399 (1968)). 
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emphasized in their Complaint that Mark Gainor was the sole officer and director of both 
Bryan Medical and Lucor Special Investments at the time of the SPAs.19 The Complaint 
alleges that the "in regard to actions of the Plaintiff corporations or inactions of those 
corporation, or what the corporations 'knew' prior to the respective sale of their 
outstanding stock in December 1999, such knowledge, action and/or inactions were a 
sole function of its sole director and officer, Defendant Gainor. .. " 
Although Advisor Defendants argue the equitable defense of in pari delicto as an 
alternative ground to grant their motions, "the doctrine of clean hands has no application 
in a suit for damages for breach of a fiduciary relationship." Gibbs v. Dodson, 229 Ga. 
App. 64, 67 (1997) (refusing to apply the in pari delicto defense in a civil suit between 
two former partners in a funeral home business where the partner who bought out the 
first partner did not inform him of a third party's offer to purchase the business prior to 
the sale). 
19 Plaintiffs' Complaint 26 "From September 10, 1999 until December 14, 1999-a time 
period in which many of the salient events giving rise to the claims in this action 
occurred, including the sale of stock of Bryan of December 14, 1999-Defendant Mark 
Gainor was both the sole Director and the sole officer of the corporation, simultaneously 
holding the positions of Director, President, Vice President, and Secretary of Bryan with 
no other persons serving as an officer or director of the corporation." 
Plaintiffs' Complaint 30 "To Plaintiff's [sic] knowledge, Defendant Gainor was the lone 
person who in fact made operational, financial and tax related decisions for [Bryan] prior 
to the sale of the stock of [Bryan] on December 14,1999. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint 50 "On or about November 12, 1999, Gainor medical USA 
(GMUSA), a company controlled by Defendant Gainor and for whom Defendant Gainor 
was a director and sole officer, merged with and into Lucor Special Investments, Inc., 
(LSI), with LSI emerging from the merger as the surviving entity. As sole officer and/or 
as a director of GMUSA prior to that merger with and into LSI, Defendant Gainor was 
responsible for actions taken by GMUSA .... " 
Plaintiffs' Complaint 52 "From November 12, 1999 until a sale of all outstanding stock of 
LIS that occurred on December 23,1999 .... , Defendant Gainor, then a Georgia 
resident, was the sole officer and the sole director of LSI, holding the positions of 
Director. President, Chief Executive Officer, Treasurer and Secretary, with no other 
person serving as an officer or director of the corporation." 
Plaintiffs' Complaint 57 "As the sole Director, CEO, President and Officer of LIS until 
December 23, 1999, pursuant to the bylaws of the corporation, Defendant Mark Gainor 
was the individual person with the authority to conduct full day-to-day control of the 
corporation and its activities and to bind the corporation. To Plaintiff's knowledge, 
Defendant Gainor was the lone person who in fact made operation, financial and tax-
related decisions for LSI (now PIC) prior to the sale of its stock on December [23], 
1999." 
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The instant case is distinguishable from Laddin, of course, because Mark Gainor 
was not the sole shareholder of Bryan Medical or Lucor Special Investments. Bryan 
Medical and Lucor Special Investments each had a sole shareholder, but it was MJG 
Partners LP, a Gainor family partnership, instead of Mark Gainor individually. Mark 
Gainor, nonetheless, was the 45% limited partner in MJG Partners and a 48% member 
in MJG Ventures LLC, another Gainor family entity,20 which was the general partner and 
only of owner of MJG Partners. Mark Gainor was also the sole director and officer of 
both Bryan Medical and Lucor Special Investments. While Mark Gainor was not the 
sole shareholder, he unquestionably exercised complete control over both Bryan 
Medical as the controlling shareholde~1 and sole director and officer. Mark Gainor was 
the person who dominated and controlled the corporation for purposes of 
"orchestrat[ing] the [alleged] fraudulent conduct." In re Friedman's Inc., 394 B.R. 623, 
633 (S.D.Ga. 2008). 
Defendants also advance a closely related argument-that the actions of the sole 
corporate actor/owner be imputed to the corporation so that the corporation "consents" 
to the officer's self-dealing transaction. See e.g., 3A Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 1103 
(2008). Ultimately, under this theory there can be no claim of fraud, breach of fiduciary 
duty, or aiding and abetting those torts where the sole corporate actor/owner commits 
the torts. See e.g., Matter of Mediators, Inc., 190 B.R. 515,528 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
("whatever decisions [the sole shareholder] made were, by definition, authorized by, and 
20 MJG Ventures LLC, the general partner of MJG Partners, was owned by four 
shareholders: Mark Gainor with 48%, Elyse Gainor with 26%, M.C. Gainor (sister) with 
13%, and Raymond D. Gainor (father) with 13%. 
21 This conclusion is reached by looking at his combined vote in MJG Ventures and 
MJG Partners and in consideration of the fact that the other owners are his father, wife, 
and sister. 
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made on behalf of, the corporation"); Battleground Veterinary Hosp. P.C., v. McGeogh, 
2007 WL 3071618, at *17 (N.C. Super. Oct. 19,2007) (finding that a sole shareholder 
could not breach a fiduciary duty owed only to himself); Anderson v. Estate of Benson, 
394 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that a corporation's sole 
shareholder "was free to dispose of the corporate assets as she pleased and she was 
not obliged to favor the interests of the corporation over her own"). 
In Matter of Mediators, Inc., 190 B.R. 515, 527 -529 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), the 
Southern District Court of New York addressed aiding and abetting claims against a 
former corporate actor/owner for alleged self dealing brought by the corporation's 
predecessors in interest. The Court dismissed the aiding and abetting claims against 
the corporate actor/owner finding that "the corporation's sole shareholder has, through 
his participation, impliedly consented to the transactions that form the basis of plaintiff's 
aiding and abetting claim." JJ;!. at 528. The Court reasoned that "Manney was the 
Mediators' sole shareholder and decision maker, and therefore, whatever decisions he 
made were, by definition, authorized by, and made on behalf of, the corporation." Id. 
Ultimately, the Court held that "a corporation can consent to an officer's self-dealing 
transaction, and that Mediators did just that in this case." Id. 
Similarly, in Battleground Veterinary Hosp. P.C., v. McGeogh, 2007 WL 3071618, 
(N.C. Super. Oct. 19,2007), the North Carolina Business Court addressed a similar 
question of whether or not a former sole shareholder could be liable to the successor in 
interest to his former corporation for breach of fiduciary duties. In Battleground, like in 
Mediators, McGeough was the sole shareholder, officer and director of Battleground. 
McGeough granted a right to purchase to VetCorp, a corporation that also, through a 
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services agreement, operated the Battleground Clinic . .!Q. at *4. McGeough nullified 
non-compete covenants he and his wife executed on behalf of Battleground. Both he 
and his wife terminated their employment with Battleground and shortly thereafter 
opened their own veterinary clinic. Id. VetCorp then exercised its option to purchase 
Battleground and brought suit alleging a breach of the services agreement (to VetCorp) 
and breach of fiduciary duty to Battleground against McGeough. Id. at *5. McGeough 
moved to dismiss the claim on the grounds that as sole shareholder, director, and 
officer, he "cannot be guilty of breach of fiduciary duty as to Battleground, since his 
actions could only have harmed him as Battleground's sole shareholder. .. " lQ. at *17. 
The North Carolina Business Court granted McGeough's motion to dismiss the fiduciary 
duty claims because McGeough owed fiduciary duties to act in Battleground's best 
interest, but he owed those duties to himself. "Thus, to hold that Mark McGeough 
breached a fiduciary duty would mean only that he breached a duty to himself. Because 
this conclusion is a non sequitur, the Court declines to adopt it." lQ. 
Plaintiffs allege that it was Gainor who was the "lone person who in fact made 
operational, financial and tax-related decisions." He was the sole director and officer 
and controlling shareholder of both corporations at the time of the SPAs and the Court 
finds that there was no one else to whom the Advisor Defendants could have given 
reasonable notice of the "true" purpose of the tax scheme. 
The Court finds that the adverse interest exception does not apply to the facts of 
this case. Mark Gainor's control over and positions as sole actor and representative of 
Bryan Medical and Lucor Special Investments are sufficient to impute the knowledge of 
Gainor to Bryan Medical and Lucor Special Investments, and therefore, to Plaintiffs. 
Such knowledge initiates the statute of limitation in 1999 and bars Plaintiffs' claims 
against the Advisor Defendants as untimely raised.22 See Cochran Mill Assoc. v. 
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Stephens, 286 Ga. App. 241 (2007); see also, Alice Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, Inc. 
v Halleman, 775 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. App. 1989) (declining to toll a statute of 
limitation on a claim to recover funds from a former sole shareholder to the time when 
the new owners learned of the transactions because the corporation had knowledge 
even if the new owners did not). 
In light of the above, the Court does not have to address the difficult question of 
whether the line of reasoning in Battleground extends to this case.23 
Based upon the Court's finding that Mark Gainor's knowledge is imputed to 
Bryan Medical (now BVI) and Lucor Special Investments (now PIC) and therefore, 
Plaintiffs' claims against the Advisor Defendants are barred by the statute of limitations, 
the Court will not address the Advisor Defendants' arguments regarding whether or not 
they engaged in fraud to conceal the cause of action necessary to toll the statute of 
limitations. See e.g., D.C.G.A. § 9-3-96; Charter Peachford Behavioral Health System 
v. Kohout, 233 Ga. App. 452, 457-458 (1998) ("The key element for such tolling to 
apply is that the fraud must have debarred or deterred plaintiff from bringing the suit 
timely."); see also, Smith, Miller & Patch v. Lorentzson, 254 Ga. 11 (1985) (holding that 
allegations of fraud for tolling purposes must be made at the defendant or those under 
22 The applicable statute of limitations is four years. Hendry v. Wells, 286 Ga. App. 774 
~2007). 
3 To apply the Battleground reasoning, the Court must conclude that Gainor's control 
(as opposed to sole shareholder status) is per se sufficient to void a claim of breach of 
fiduciary duties against Gainor where there are other potential shareholders to whom 
Gainor owed a fiduciary duty, but who are not before the Court in this action. 
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whom the plaintiff claims are guilty of the fraud); Goldstone v. Bank of America, 259 Ga. 
App. 690 (2003); McClung Surveying, Inc. v. Worl, 247 Ga. App. 322 (2000). 
The Court hereby GRANTS Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings brought by 
Defendants ML, KS & AA. 
The Gainor Defendants' Partial Motion on the Conversion Claims: 
For the reasons discussed above, this Court has held that Mark Gainor's 
knowledge is imputed to Bryan Medical (now BVI) and Lucor Special Investments (now 
PIC). Despite Plaintiffs' many allegations of fraudulent actions by Gainor to conceal the 
alleged conversion resulting from the tax scheme (Le., the Opinion Letter, the tax 
affidavits, etc.), because this Court has found that Bryan Medical (now BVI) and Lucor 
Special Investments (now PIC) obtained Gainor's knowledge regarding the tax scheme 
in 1999, Plaintiffs' conversion claims are therefore barred as untimely filed outside of the 
statute of limitations. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-32 ("Actions for the recovery of personal property, 
or for damages for the conversion or destruction of the same, shall be brought within 
four years after the right of action accrues."); Logan v. Tucker, 224 Ga. App. 404, 406 
(1997) (stating that a conversion cause of action generally accrues on the date of the 
conversion unless the conversion is accompanied by a physical injury, in which case the 
continuing tort theory may apply). The Gainor Defendants' motion is hereby GRANTED 
with respect to the conversion count and its related claims. This ruling does not dismiss 
the claims for attorneys fees arising, in part, in contract under the SPAs against the 
Gainor Defendants in Counts 5, 9, and 13 of the Complaint. 
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Plaintiffs' Motion on Arthur Andersen's Counterclaims: 
Defendant Arthur Andersen filed counterclaims against Plaintiffs seeking 
indemnification pursuant to the terms of a September 1999 engagement letter, signed 
by Mark Gainor on behalf of Bryan Medical and Lucor Speciallnvestments,24 for costs 
incurred by Arthur Andersen in the Florida I Action brought by Mark Gainor. The 
Andersen engagement letter contained an indemnity clause25 for third party claims 
brought against Andersen arising from the engagement. Plaintiffs petition the Court to 
dismiss Andersen's claims on the grounds that (a) Mark Gainor is not a "third party" to 
the engagement letter, and (b) that Andersen provided insufficient and untimely notice 
of the claims. 26 
The term "third party" is not defined by the agreement prepared by Arthur 
Andersen. Plaintiffs argue that the terms "third party" and "stranger" are synonymous 
and should be used interchangeably by the Court in applying the tortious interference 
definition of "stranger" to the facts of this case. In a tortuous interference context, a 
person who has a legitimate economic interest in a contract is a party to a contract; and 
a person who executes a legal contract on behalf of a corporation that is a party to a 
contract is not a stranger to the contract. See e.g., Atlanta Market Center Management 
Co. v. McLane, 269 Ga. 604, 608 (1998); Nicholson v. Windham, 257 Ga. App. 429, 
24 The engagement letter was signed on behalf of GMUSA, which merged with Lucor 
Special Investments in November 1999, prior to the closing of the SPA. 
25 "[Plaintiff] will upon receipt of written notice indemnify Andersen, its affiliates and their 
partners, principals and personnel against all fees, expense, damages and liabilities 
(including defense costs) associated with any third party claim arising from or relating 
to any such services, work product or deliverables that are used or disclosed to others, 
or this engagement." (emphasis added). 
26 Andersen did not provide notice of any claims until Sept. 19, 2008 after this action 
was initiated. 
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432 (2002). For example, in Hammer Corp. v. Wade, 278 Ga. App. 214, 219 (2006), 
the Georgia Court of Appeals found that the defendant could not be a stranger to the 
contract in question because he signed the contracts on behalf of the company in which 
he was the sole officer and director. 
Defendant Arthur Andersen hinges its arguments in support of the counterclaims 
based upon Plaintiffs' assertions in this action that Mr. Gainor was not acting in the 
company's best interest when he signed the engagement letters, implemented the tax 
scheme, or brought the Florida I Action. Therefore, Defendant Andersen concludes that 
the claims filed by Mr. Gainor in the Florida I Action constitute "third party claims" for 
which Plaintiffs are obligated to indemnify them. Defendant Andersen also claims that 
the definition of a "third party" and whether or not Andersen qualifies as a third party 
raise questions of fact inappropriate for resolution by a motion to dismiss. 
Applying the rules of contract construction, the Court must first determine 
whether an ambiguity exists, and if so, whether it may be resolved by application of the 
rules of contract construction. See ULQ, LLC v. Meder, 293 Ga. App. 176, 178 (2008). 
The Court finds that the term 'third party' is unambiguous. Megel v. 
Donaldson, 288 Ga. App. 510, 513 (2007) ("The cardinal rule of construction is to 
ascertain the intention of the parties .... no construction is required or even permitted 
when the language employed by the parties in the contract is plain, unambiguous, and 
capable of only one reasonable interpretation."); O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2 ("Words generally 
bear their usual and common signification."). The engagement lette~7 states that 
"Bryan [Medical] will upon the receipt of written notice indemnify [Arthur 
27 An identical engagement letter was entered into by GMUSA. 
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Andersen] ... against all costs, fees, expenses, damages, and liabilities ... associated 
with any third-party claim ... " The engagement letter itself is addressed to "Bryan 
Medical Inc., Attn: Mark Gainor." The letter begins "Dear Mark" and subsequent pages 
contain the header "Mark J. Gainor". Additionally, Mark Gainor signed the engagement 
letter on behalf of his companies. 
The face of the engagement letters demonstrate that Mark Gainor was a central 
party to the engagement letter, even if in his representative capacity. The Court finds 
this sufficient to determine that Mark Gainor was not a third party to the engagement 
letter under the plain language of the contract.28 
The Court finds that Mark J. Gainor is not a third party under the terms of the 
Arthur Andersen engagement letter, and, therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings on the Counterclaims of Arthur Andersen is hereby GRANTED. Because 
the Court finds for Plaintiffs on the first ground articulated, the Court will not examine 
whether the notice sent by Plaintiffs was timely and in the appropriate manner. 
Plaintiffs' Motion on Counterclaims Raised by the Gainor Defendants: 
Defendant Mark J. Gainor, Lucor Partners Ltd., and Lucor Ventures LLC 
(collectively the "Gainor Defendants") filed counterclaims against Plaintiffs claiming 
28As alternative grounds for finding that Mark Gainor is not a third party to the 
engagement letter, the Court refers to its earlier portions of this Order finding that Mark 
Gainor was the sole actor for the predecessor companies. Thus, under Hammer Corp. 
v. Wade, 278 Ga. App. 214, 219 (2006), Mark Gainor was not a stranger to the 
engagement letter. While the body of case law relating to tortious interference is not 
binding on the Court's interpretation in this case, it is informative to demonstrate the 
"customary" view of the legal role of corporate representatives entering into a contract 
on behalf of their corporations. 
In addition, if the Court were to have found an ambiguity in the language of the 
contract, under O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2, the presumption of interpretation goes against the 
drafter of the contract in question. Here, Arthur Andersen drafted the engagement letter 
and thus, the Court would resolve any lingering ambiguities in Plaintiffs' favor. 
fraud, seeking a declaratory judgment that they owed no indemnity obligations to 
Plaintiffs, seeking attorneys' fees, and alternatively, seeking to enforce a "true up" 
provision in the SPAs. 
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Plaintiffs seek dismissal of the counterclaims primarily on the grounds that the 
Gainor Defendants entered into several general releases, indemnity provisions, and 
covenants not to sue in conjunction with the SPAs. Additionally, Plaintiffs seek 
dismissal on the grounds that Mark J. Gainor, as the sole actor for Bryan Medical and 
Lucor Special Investments Inc., could not be defrauded by the companies over which he 
exercised control. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Gainor Defendants' request to 
enforce the "true up" provision should be dismissed as untimely, already exercised, and 
inapplicable to the claims presented in this case. Plaintiffs also petition the Court for 
sanctions pursuantto O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14. 
As stated at the outset, this motion shall be treated as a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings. As a threshold matter, the Gainor Defendants oppose the Court's 
reliance upon the SPAs attached to Klopfenstein's Third-Party Counterclaim to support 
Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings. On a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, the Court may consider all matters contained in the pleadings. O.C.G.A. § 9-
11-12(c); see also Haldi v. Piedmont Nephrology Associates, P.C., 283 Ga. App. 321 
(2007) (treating a motion to dismiss as a motion for judgment on the pleadings because 
the motion was predicated upon the plaintiffs complaint and the contract incorporated 
therein). Defendants argue that the SPAs attached to the Klopfenstein Counterclaim 
are not "pleadings" properly to be considered on Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the 
pleadings on Defendants' counterclaims.29 
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In Grand Lodge of Ga., Independent Order of Odd Fellows v. City of Thomasville, 
226 Ga. 4,9-10, (1970), the Georgia Supreme Court found that: 
"Under the rulings in the proceeding divisions of this opinion, the court properly 
denied the motion of the defendant for judgment on the pleadings. While the 
complaint, as amended, stated a cause of action, it was error to grant the motion 
of the plaintiffs for judgment on the pleadings. The allegation of prior possession 
of the described land which the plaintiffs sought to recover was made by an 
amendment. No responsive pleadings are required to an amendment. Averments 
in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required are considered as 
denied. An issue of fact was thus made as to the prior possession of the plaintiffs 
which should have been submitted to the jury. 
(citing Ga. Code Ann. s 81A-108(d)). Defendants argue that because a response was 
not required on the counterclaim that the allegations are taken as denied and thus 
create a question of fact. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(d) ("Averments in a pleading to which 
no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided."); 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-7(a) ("There shall be a complaint and an answer. ... [t]here may be a 
reply to a counterclaim"). 
The SPAs in question, however, form the basis of the Gainor Defendants' 
counterclaims. Defendants rely upon the alleged fraud in the inducement with regard to 
the SPAs as grounds for seeking a declaratory judgment regarding their indemnification 
obligations as alleged by Plaintiffs in their Complaint,30 all of which arise under the 
29 Plaintiffs cite to Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found. v. State Election Bd., 282 Ga. 707, 
132 n.2 (2007) (C.J. Sears, dissenting), for the proposition that a Court can enter 
judgment on the pleadings on the allegations and exhibits attached to the Counterclaim 
filed by a different party. In Charles H. Wesley, however, the majority upheld the motion 
to dismiss because of the insufficiency of the complaint without consideration of the 
additional documents in question. 282 Ga. 707. 
30 Plaintiffs reference the SPAs throughout their Complaint in such paragraphs as: 36-
42; 60-67; 148; 182; 186-190; 193-195; 214-216; 243; 256-258; 265; 278-282; and 289, 
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SPAs. Additionally, the Gainor Defendants' third count in their counterclaim seeks 
enforcement of a true-up provision contained in the SPAs. Similarly, Plaintiffs' motion 
extensively references and quotes the SPAs. As such, the Court concludes that the 
SPAs, by references and quotations in the relevant pleadings before the Court, if not by 
their attachment to the Third Party Answer, may be considered by the Court in this 
motion.31 
The Gainor Defendants' first argument is that the SPA provisions granting 
Plaintiffs indemnity, releases, and covenants not to sue were procured as a result of 
fraud perpetrated by Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest at the direction of Mark 
Klopfenstein and are, thus, unenforceable. The Gainor Defendants allege that they 
were induced to enter into a series of transactions with Klopfenstein and his companies 
in order to generate a $70 million tax loss, which Klopfenstein and his conspirators, 
including TransStar, represented were legitimate tax losses rather than an illegal tax 
evasion shelter. 
including quotations of the relevant indemnity provisions, releases, guarantees, and 
other provisions of the SPAS in paragraphs 36; 38; 188; 187; and 189. 
31 "[T]he Georgia Civil Practice Act was taken from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and with slight immaterial variations its sections are substantially identical to 
corresponding rules. Because of this similarity it is proper that we give consideration 
and great weight to constructions placed on the Federal Rules by the federal courts." 
Barnum v. Coastal Health Services, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 209, 215 (2007). 
In In re Keithley Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation, 268 F. Supp. 2d 887 (N.D. Ohio 
2002), the court properly considered the full text of the SEC filings, prospectus, analyst's 
reports and statements integral to the complaint, even if not attached, without 
converting the motion into one for summary judgment in a securities fraud case. "[A] 
court may consider documents to which the plaintiffs refer in their complaint, even if the 
plaintiffs do not attach them as exhibits, as long as those documents are central to 
plaintiffs' claims, and court may consider records and matters of which a court may 
take judicial notice." lQ. at 893. (emphasis added). 
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First, the Gainor Defendants fail to plead their allegations of fraud with 
particularity. D.C.G.A. 9-11-9(b). Second, their argument is flawed because, as the 
Gainor Defendants previously argued before this Court, Mark Gainor was the sole 
actor/representative of Bryan Medical (now BVI) and Lucor Special Investments Inc., 
(now PIC). Therefore, his knowledge of the illegal tax scheme was imputed to Plaintiffs' 
predecessor-in-interest corporations. Finally, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that 
Defendants' affirmation of the contract through their acceptance of the purchase price 
and subsequent payment of indemnification claims further refute Defendants' claims of 
fraud. 
The Gainor Defendants seek $160,000.00 from Plaintiffs for indemnity fees paid 
by the Gainor Defendants from 2002-2007, and they seek a declaratory judgment from 
the Court that they are not obligated to indemnify Plaintiffs pursuant to the SPAs. The 
Bryan Medical and Lucor Special Investments SPAs contained indemnity provisions,32 a 
guaranty,33 and a release,34 which the Gainor Defendants argue are void because they 
32 Art. 7.1 "Indemnification of Purchaser. Subject to the terms and conditions in this 
Article VII, the Shareholder shall indemnify, defendant and hold harmless the Purchaser 
and upon consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby, the Company, and 
the directors, officers, agents, employees, and Affiliates of each from and against any 
loss, damage, Liability, cost and expense, ... suffered or incurred by any Purchaser, 
Indemnitee ... ". 
33 Article 5.7 of the SPAs requires an "unconditional guaranty in form and content 
acceptable to Purchaser, executed by Mark Gainor to guarantee the obligations of the 
Company and the Shareholder hereunder." 
34 The General Release stated that it was made for the benefit of "Bryan Holdings, LLC 
... (the "Purchaser"), and its Affiliates, successors and assigns .... " The General 
Release stated that "[f]or good and valuable consideration ... the undersigned [MJG 
Partners, LP, Mark J. Gainor as Member, and Elyse S. Gainor, as Member] does 
hereby release and forever discharge the Purchaser, the Company, and their respective 
Affiliates, successors and assignees from any and all liabilities, obligations, claims, 
demands, rights or causes of action existing or relating to transactions or events 
occurring on or prior to the execution and delivery of the Stock Purchase Agreement, 
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were procured by fraud. In addition, Defendants argue that indemnification for illegal 
acts and intentional torts is contrary to public policy and should not be enforced. See 
~, Crawford v. Johnson, 157 Ga. App. 719,720 (1981). The Court finds thatthe 
illegal tax deductions are separate transactions from the underlying stock purchase 
agreements entered into between Mark Klopfenstein and Mark Gainor, through their 
entities, which were not illegal, but are valid and enforceable contracts. See e.g., 
Pacheco v. Charles Crews Custom Homes, Inc., 289 Ga. App. 773 (2008) (affirming a 
trial court's grant of summary judgment on claims of negligent construction barred by a 
mutual release entered into by plaintiff). 
The Gainor Defendants seek the alternative relief of a set-off under the "true up" 
provision of the SPAs. Article 4.5 of the SPAs provide for a purchase-price adjustment 
and constitutes a true up provision. The relevant language provides for an adjustment 
in the event that the net realizable asset value of the Company is higher or lower than 
anticipated as of the close of business on a specified date in December 1999. The 
provision also requires that Arthur Andersen determine the net realizable asset value of 
the company and to "promptly upon such determination notify the Purchaser and the 
Shareholder of any Short Fall or Excess" and requires subsequent payments from either 
the purchaser or the seller. Plaintiffs argue that the Court should grant their motion on 
the grounds that (a) this provision was already exercised in January, 2000 resulting in a 
purchase price adjustment, (b) there has been no notice from Arthur Andersen 
regarding any further purchase price adjustments, and (c) that the claims were not 
timely raised with the 2008 notice. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that a claim for set-
whether known or unknown, direct or indirect, liquidated, matured, contingent or 
otherwise .... " 
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off based upon Article 4.5 under the SPA has not been pled by the Gainor Defendants 
based upon the plain language of the SPA. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the indemnity obligations, the releases, the 
guarantees, and the language of Section 4.5 of the SPAs warrant the Court's 
GRANTING of Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Counts I, II, and III of 
the Counterclaim. 
Third Party Defendant Mark Klopfenstein's Motion to Dismiss Third Party Claims: 
Third Party Defendant Mark Klopfenstein brings a Motion to Dismiss, or in the 
alternative, for a Judgment on the Pleadings35 on the third party claims brought by the 
Third Party Plaintiffs/Defendants Mark Gainor, Lucor Partners, Ltd., and Lucor Ventures 
LLC. The Third Party Complaint alleges that Mark Klopfenstein and other "conspirators" 
made fraudulent misrepresentations to the Third Party Plaintiffs regarding the "nature 
and purpose of the Tax Plan" and seeks attorneys' fees and expenses pursuant to 
a.c.G.A. § 13-6-11. 
Mark Gainor on behalf of MJG Partners entered into certain indemnity 
obligations, guarantees, and releases as a part of the SPAs. Mark Klopfenstein, as the 
individual controlling the purchaser TranStar and in control of Plaintiffs BVI and PIC, 
successors in interest to purchasers, is an affiliate36 of the purchaser as defined in the 
35 As discussed in greater detail above, the Court will consider SPAs attached as 
exhibits to Klopfenstein's Third Party Answer and will evaluate this motion under a 
judgment on the pleadings standard. 
36 "Affiliate of a Person shall mean any other Person directly or indirectly controlling, 
controlled by or under common control with such Person. The term "control" in this 
definition shall mean possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause 
the direction of the management and polices of the relevant Person through ownership 
of voting securities, by Contract or otherwise." 
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SPAs, and, thus, encompassed in the obligations arising under the SPAs. Accordingly, 
the provisions discussed above apply to Mark Klopfenstein. 
The Third Party Plaintiffs argue that the SPAs were entered into under fraudulent 
circumstances which negate the effect of the indemnity obligations, the releases, and 
the guaranty. The Court is not persuaded that the allegations contained in the Third 
Party Complaint state a sufficient claim for fraud arising from misrepresentations 
regarding the legality of proposed tax deductions. The SPAs at issue were negotiated 
by independent parties represented by reputable law firms. The SPAs do not discuss 
tax deductions intended to be claimed by either Mark Gainor or his entities, nor do the 
SPAs make any representations regarding proposed tax deductions. The effect of the 
merger clause in the SPAs along with the indemnity provision, release, and guaranty, 
are such as to bar the Third Party Plaintiffs' claims as pled. Accordingly, the Court 
hereby GRANTS Third Party Defendant Mark Klopfenstein's Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings. 
Defendant Mark Gainor's Motion to Stay: 
Defendant Mark Gainor petitions this Court to stay this action pending resolution 
of the Florida I and Florida II Actions. Defendant Gainor argues that such a stay serves 
judicial economy, that res judicata will bar re-litigation of the similar claims in this and 
the federal actions, and that first-filed rule should be followed in this action. 
The Court has discretionary power to stay a case for judicial economy. See e.g., 
Fludd v. Tiller, 184 Ga. App. 93, 93 (1987) (reversing a trial court's stay of a state court 
proceeding, but stating in dicta that a "trial court certainly had the discretion to stay the 
state proceeding until the disposition of the pending federal action ... "); Bloomfield v. 
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Liggett & Myers, Inc., 129 Ga. App. 141 (1973) (affirming a trial court's stay of a state 
court action "pending the determination of a suit previously filed by defendants against 
plaintiff" in federal court in order to avoid multiplicity of suits). 
Additionally, Defendants urge the Court to stay this case because res judicata 
and collateral estoppel will bar re-litigation of the majority of claims presented in this 
action. "A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the 
same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of 
law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until 
the judgment is reversed or set aside." D.C.G.A. § 9-12-40. Hardy v. Georgia Baptist 
Health Care Systems Inc., 239 Ga. App. 596, 597 (1999) ("[W]here a party fails to 
present a state law claim in federal court, a later suit in the state courts will be barred if 
the state claim could have been litigated in the federal court under its pendent 
jurisdiction."); Waldroup v. Greene County Hosp. Auth., 265 Ga. 864, 867 (1995) 
(applying collateral estoppel to issues already litigated and decided in previous federal 
litigation). Defendants argue that the parties,37 claims, and issues are substantially 
similar in this case and the Florida I and II Action. 
37 Defendants argue that the primary parties in the Florida I and II Action and this action 
are the same: Mark Gainor, Mark Klopfenstein, BVI, and PIC either individually or 
through their privities. Privities are "those legally represented at the triaL" Smith v. 
Wood, 115 Ga. App. 265, 269 (1967) ("Privity connotes those who are in law so 
connected with a party to the judgment as to have such an identity of interest that the 
party to the judgment represented the same legal right; and where this identity is found 
to exist, all are .... bound by the judgment."). 
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that BVI and PIC were not parties to the Florida 1 
Action. Additionally, Plaintiffs highlight that Lucor Ventures, Lucor Partners, King & 
Spalding, Arnold & Porter and Rachlin LP were not parties to the Florida I Action, as 
well as that Mark Gainor dismissed claims against Defendants Merrill Lynch and Arthur 
Andersen in the Florida I Action. 
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Finally, Defendants rely on the first filed rule, which provides that when parties 
have instituted competing or parallel litigation in separate federal courts, the court 
initially having jurisdiction should hear the case. Supreme International Corp. v. 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1997). Plaintiffs argue that the first-
filed rule should not be applied to the Florida II Action, which they argue was 
preemptively filed in response to their demand letter served upon the Gainor 
Defendants. The proper court to consider the arguments regarding the first-filed rule, 
however, is the Southern District of Florida38 where the Florida II Action was filed, not 
this Court. See, e.g., Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Marshall, 381 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 
1967) (upholding a trial court's dismissal of a "first-filed" action on the grounds that the 
lawsuit was filed after receiving a demand letter in anticipation of the New York suit); 
Supreme International Corporation, 972 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (declining to 
dismiss its case, the second-filed action, despite evidence that the first-filed case was 
done so in response to a demand letter, on the grounds that the first-filed court is the 
more appropriate forum in which to determine whether the first-filed case should 
proceed, or whether it should give way for reasons of judicial economy to this action). 
This Court's ruling on the previously addressed motions to dismiss and motions 
for judgment on the pleadings significantly narrow the issues in this case and may moot 
in part, a substantial basis for Defendant Mark Gainor's Motion to Stay. Therefore, the 
Court hereby GRANTS a temporary stay of the case until such time as the parties 
appear before the court for a status conference. Plaintiffs' counsel shall contact the 
38 On March 16, 2009, Judge Martinez of the Southern District of Florida denied 
defendants' (BIV and PIC) Motion to Stay. The Court declined to dismiss the Florida II 
Action on the grounds that the "first filed suit" was preemptively filed. 
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Court within 10 days of the date of this Order with proposed dates for a status 
conference to take place within forty-five (45) days of this Order. 
Conclusion: 
As moved, the Court hereby DISMISSES Plaintiffs' claims against King & 
Spalding, Arthur Andersen, Merrill Lynch, and the Gainor Defendants; Counterclaims 
brought by Arthur Andersen and the Gainor Defendants against Plaintiffs; and the Third 
Party Complaint brought by the Gainor Defendants against Mark Klopfenstein. 
Remaining claims in this case are STAYED until after the parties report to the Court for 
a status conference within forty-five (45) days. 
SO ORDERED this ~ day of Ar y}' J ,2009. 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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